Lynn Takata (Takata) was the named insured under a personal automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). It contained terms and conditions for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits that applied to a person's injury resulting from the use, occupancy or maintenance of any motor vehicle. On the evening of May 5, Takata arrived home from work and parked her car on the side of a two-lane road, Broadway Street, on the side opposite of her house. She removed some work-related items from the back seat, leaving others, crossed the street to her home and placed the items inside. She returned to her car with her dog on its leash, assessed the other items she needed to unload, decided she would do it later and began to cross the street to her house. She was struck and injured by a bicyclist riding down the hill when she was roughly three-fourths of the way across the two-lane road.

Takata filed a claim for PIP benefits with State Farm, seeking to recover her medical expenses and lost income. State Farm denied the claim, stating that the accident was not the result of her use or occupancy of the car and did not fall within the coverage provided. Takata sued, seeking a judgment obligating State Farm to pay the claim. Both parties agreed that the coverage hinged on whether her injuries resulted from her use or occupancy of the car. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that Takata's injuries resulted from her use of the car to transport and store items and granted her summary judgment. It denied State Farm's cross-motion without deciding whether her injuries alternatively resulted from her occupancy of the vehicle. State Farm appealed, with the issue being whether Takata was injured as a result of either her use or her occupancy of the car.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Oregon determined that the essential, required connection or linkage between the use of the car and the injury was missing. Takata suggested two possible predictive uses, one of which was the use of her car to drive home, which ended when she parked the car. The other was her use of the vehicle to carry and store items, which arguably encompassed her return to it and ended mere seconds before she was struck by the cyclist. In absolute "but for" causation terms, Takata would not have been re-crossing the street and, as a result, would not have been hit by the cyclist "but for" either or both of those uses. However, applicable previous case law required more than an absolute "but for" connection. It required a consequential connection between the use and the injurious event. In this case, the nature of Takata's use of her car, for driving or for carriage and storage purposes, had no consequential relationship to the speeding cyclist who caused the injury. The cyclist was going to be there irrespective of the use of the car and nothing about her use of the car increased the likelihood that she would sustain injuries because of being struck by the cyclist.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in determining that her injuries resulted from the use of a motor vehicle, with respect to PIP coverage. It also examined Takata's alternative argument regarding occupancy of the vehicle that the trial court did not address and cited other case law that was conclusive in that regard and precluded her argument in that respect. It concluded that her use of the car had no consequential relationship to the injuries that she sustained as required for entitlement to PIP benefits, in addition to not having arisen from her occupancy of the vehicle. It reversed the trial court's decision that granted Takata's motion for summary judgment and denied State Farm's motion for summary judgment.

Court of Appeals of Oregon. Lynn Takata, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a foreign company, Defendant-Appellant. 050808108; A 133661. Argued and Submitted Aug 17, 2007. Decided Jan. 23, 2008. 217 Or.App. 454, 176P.3d 415