A garbage truck that IESI Corporation (IESI) owned driven by Julia Rashall was struck from the rear on January 28, 2005 by a vehicle owned by Charles K. Pennington operated by his son, Charles A. Pennington. On July 14, 2005, Rashall filed suit to recover the damages she sustained in the accident against both Penningtons, Safeway Insurance Company (Charles K. Pennington’s liability insurer), and American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania (American) as IESI’s Uninsured Motorists (UM) carrier.
American filed a motion for summary judgment on May 11, 2006 (amended with a supplemental pleading on August 20, 2007). It asked to be dismissed from the litigation based on its opinion that its policy did not provide UM coverage. Rashall responded on May 21, 2007 with her own motion for summary judgment that asked the trial court to declare that American did in fact provide UM coverage to her.
The trial court held a hearing on these motions on September 17, 2007 and denied both motions. Both American and Rashall filed pleadings asking the trial court to reconsider its ruling on their motions. On October 12, 2007, the trial court denied American’s motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment in Rashall’s favor. American appealed, asserting that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that its policy provided UM coverage for Rashall’s accident and in not dismissing it as a party defendant in the litigation.
The appellate court determined that there were no factual issues, only legal issues. The policy in effect at the time of the accident was a renewal policy that covered the time period from December 31, 2004 through December 31, 2005. An IESI representative executed a valid waiver of UM coverage in the previous year’s policy. However, when renewing the policy for the 2004 to 2005 period, the IESI representative failed to date the form that requested a waiver of UM coverage.
In arguing that its policy did not provide UM coverage, American stated that the valid UM rejection for the previous policy period effected a continued rejection of UM coverage in the renewal policy based on Louisiana law (La.R.S. 22:680). The pertinent part of the statute that applies to the situation in this case reads as follows:
“Such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal…policy when the named insured has rejected the coverage…in connection with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer or any of its affiliates…Such rejection shall be made only on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance…” (emphasis added)
“The form signed by the insured or his legal representative which initially rejects coverage…shall remain valid for the life of the policy and shall not require the completion of a new selection form when a renewal…policy is issued to the same named insured by the same insurer or any of its affiliates. An insured may change the original uninsured motorists selection or rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the policy by submitting a new uninsured motorists selection form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.” (emphasis added)
The appellate court concluded that there was no question that “an initial valid rejection of UM coverage was also valid for renewal, reinstatement, or substitute policies.” It rejected Rashall’s argument that the IESI representative failing to date the waiver form on renewal effectively revoked the prior rejection. It stated that the evidence presented established only that IESI did not properly execute the form that reaffirmed its original decision to reject UM coverage.
In addition, on this appeal, American asserted that the trial court erred in granting Rashall’s motion for summary judgment as well as in not granting American’s. American asked the appellate court to exercise its power and render summary judgment in its favor. The appellate court noted that it is both authorized and required to render a judgment that is just, legal, and proper, including the ability to grant a party’s motion for summary judgment when the record justifies doing so. It summarized the case before it by stating that Rashall’s only claim against American was based on the existence of UM coverage under the auto policy for IESI. Because the policy did not provide that coverage, she did not have a claim against American and the trial court erred in granting her summary judgment and denying American’s motion for summary judgment.
The appellate court reversed and rendered the trial court’s decision in favor of Rashall and granted summary judgment in American’s favor. It assessed all costs of the appeal to Rashall.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit. Julia A. Rashall v. Charles K. Pennington, et al. No. 2008-0001. April 30, 2008. Rehearing Denied June 5, 2008. 982 So.2d, 301, 2008-0001 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08)
